Research

My research so far focuses on extensional theories of modality—particularly counterpart theory, modal realism, and neo-conventionalism. I am especially interested in the phenomenon of advanced modalizing and am developing a novel account of modality that integrates neo-conventionalism with counterpart theory.

Journal Articles

Neo-Conventionalist Accounts of Necessity

Philosophy Compass 19 (11). 2024.


Conventionalism about necessity was deemed hopeless for a long time. The philosophical landscape, however, is shifting now with recent work in modal metaphysics locating the source of necessity in some kind of convention, albeit non-linguistic. Modal neo-conventionalists claim that a proposition is necessary just when it is true and is classified as such as a matter of convention. But what is the function of adopting a convention about necessity? And what are these conventions that distinguish what is possible from what is impossible, anyway? In this paper, I first offer an elucidation of the two accounts of neo-conventionalism, which I call ‘worlds-based neo-conventionalism’ and ‘axiom-based neo-conventionalism’. Then, I discuss a number of pressing questions that modal neo-conventionalism faces. The moral is that neo-conventionalists have some work to do in order for the account to be explanatorily satisfactory.


On the Function of Advanced Modalizing

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 124 (3): 383-393. 2024.


The Lewisian account of modality based on counterpart theory suffers from the problems of advanced modalizing, where claims about spatiotemporally disunified entities are modalized. In this paper, I first discuss a strategy to bypass the problem, one which treats cases of advanced modalizing as cases of equivocation lying outside the scope of the translation. I then argue that the strategy does not satisfactorily generalize to the case of advanced modal claims involving abstract entities. This failure not only reveals the limitations of counterpart theory in handling abstracta, but also weakens the abductive argument for modal realism that posits it as a robust account of nominalism. Furthermore, advanced modalizing is an indispensable part of the Lewisian framework when doing metaphysics, since advanced modal claims made by Lewis himself strengthen his abductive argument for modal realism. Hence advanced modalizing plays a crucial role in the Lewisian project, and an account of advanced modalizing is needed for the Lewisian reduction of modality to succeed.

Works in Progress

Papers under review (titles and abstracts removed for the purposes of blind review / e-mail for a draft):


  • A paper on the interaction of modal realism with necessitism.
  • A paper developing a new account of advanced modalizing.

Papers in preparation:


  • A paper on the epistemology of modality focusing on similarity accounts.
  • A paper on counterpart theory and neo-conventionalism.

PhD Thesis

You can also read my PhD thesis here.

Worlds, Counterparts and Modality

This thesis is about Counterpart Theory (CT), which is a theory of translation that renders expressions of quantified modal logic (QML) into expressions of a non-modal first-order language. I defend three main claims. First, through the formulation of the translation in terms of a formal semantics for quantified modal logic, I argue that CT should be considered a formally flexible framework where one can obtain one’s desired modal logic by manipulating the counterpart relation as needed. Secondly, through the distinction between the object language and the target language of the translation, I reply to a family of objections against the theory in the recent literature, which claim that the counterpart-theoretic translation fails in light of some modal criteria. Finally, I explore some reductionist metaphysical theories that are compatible with CT and argue that the combination of CT, understood as a minimally applied theory, with axiom-based neo-conventionalism brings the best prospects for modal reductionism.